Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
Provenance describes how software was built, attestations are signed claims about that process, and signing proves origin. Here's how the pieces fit.
Real incidents, real numbers: how modern software supply chain threat vectors work, why SBOMs alone don't stop them, and what actually closes the gap.
Video codecs are some of the most complex code in your dependency tree. Their complexity and privileged execution make them prime supply chain targets.
How Sigstore's Fulcio and Rekor make Cosign keyless container image signing possible, why Chainguard built its product around it, and where the real gaps still are.
AI code assistants recommend packages that do not exist, and attackers are registering those hallucinated names. This new typosquatting vector exploits the trust developers place in AI suggestions.
A working template for legal and security teams to assess software supply chain risk against contractual, regulatory, and licensing exposure in 2026.
Cross-platform frameworks multiply supply chain attack surfaces by combining multiple dependency ecosystems. Understanding these compounded risks is essential for modern mobile and desktop security.
SLSA defines four build integrity levels to stop supply chain tampering. Learn what each level requires, who's adopting it, and its real limits.
In-toto attestation is a signed, verifiable record of how software was built. Here's how the format works, how it differs from an SBOM, and where it's used today.
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