Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
Math.random() is predictable and unsafe for security tokens. Here's why Node's crypto.randomBytes() is the standard for secure JavaScript randomness.
Python's random module is predictable, not secure. Here's why CWE-338 matters, when the secrets module (PEP 506, Python 3.6) fixed it, and how to generate tokens safely.
Ruby's built-in rand() uses a predictable Mersenne Twister and should never generate tokens, passwords, or session IDs. Here's how SecureRandom fixes that.
PHP's mt_rand() has a 32-bit seed space attackers can crack in seconds. Here's why random_bytes() and random_int() replaced it in PHP 7.0, and how weak randomness still causes breaches.
Go's math/rand is fast but predictable. Here's why crypto/rand is the only safe choice for tokens, keys, and nonces -- and what changed in Go 1.20-1.24.
Why System.Random is a security liability in C# and how RandomNumberGenerator prevents predictable tokens, nonces, and keys in .NET applications.
Why java.util.Random and even UUID.randomUUID() can leak predictable tokens, and how Java's SecureRandom and NIST DRBG providers actually protect secrets.
A data-led look at software supply chain attacks in Q3 2025: npm maintainer phishing, VS Code extension abuse, and a quiet shift toward CI/CD targeting.
Checkmarx built an MSSP and partner program around code scanning. Here's how that model works, where it misses software supply chain risk, and what to check before signing.
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