Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
sqlx blocks SQL injection by default with compile-time query checks and bind parameters — but format!() and raw SQL calls can still reopen the gap. Here's how to audit for it.
How sqlite3_bind_text() stops SQL injection in C++ apps, common mistakes with bind parameters, and how to audit existing SQLite code for injection risk.
path.normalize() alone will not stop path traversal in Node.js. Real CVEs like node-tar show why resolve-then-compare beats normalize-then-trust.
PHP's include() turns a path traversal bug into remote code execution. See how CVE-2015-2213 and CVE-2022-1329 happened, and how to prevent it with allowlists.
os.path.normpath() and abspath() don't stop symlink-based path traversal. Here's how os.path.realpath() closes the gap, with real CVEs and a secure pattern.
filepath.Join in Go only cleans a path, it doesn't restrict it to a base directory. Here's why that gap produced real CVEs, and how to close it for good.
Path.normalize() cleans up "." and ".." in a Java path — but it doesn't stop path traversal. Here's why the Zip Slip pattern still slips past code review in 2026.
Path.GetFullPath resolves traversal sequences, but it isn't a sanitizer on its own. Here's how C# teams get containment checks wrong, and how to fix them.
How File.realpath stops path traversal in Ruby apps, why File.expand_path alone fails, and what real CVEs like Sprockets' CVE-2018-3760 reveal about secure file handling.
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