High-profile AWS breaches: lessons learned
Capital One's 2019 breach exposed 106 million records through a single SSRF call to the EC2 metadata service — here's the exact control that would have stopped it.
Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
Capital One's 2019 breach exposed 106 million records through a single SSRF call to the EC2 metadata service — here's the exact control that would have stopped it.
NIST published CCSS in December 2010 to score misconfigurations the way CVSS scores bugs — most cloud teams have never applied it.
AWS secures the cloud; you secure what's in it. Most breaches — like the thousands of exposed public S3 buckets found every year — happen entirely on the customer's side of that line.
S3 buckets are private by default — every public leak is a customer misconfiguration. Capital One's 2019 breach of 106 million records proves the boundary.
AWS IAM lets any principal with iam:CreateRole and iam:AttachRolePolicy hand themselves admin — permissions boundaries are the one native control built to stop it.
Binary Authorization can block every unsigned container from reaching GKE or Cloud Run — but only if your pipeline is wired to sign images the moment they pass scanning.
Kubernetes Secrets are base64, not encrypted. Real CVEs and the Tesla breach show how attackers exploit that gap — and how to close it.
CI/CD pipelines now hold the keys attackers want most. Here's what tj-actions, Ultralytics, and Jenkins CVE-2024-23897 reveal about the trend.
How GitHub Actions workflow injection lets attackers hijack CI pipelines via untrusted input, real CVEs like CVE-2025-30066, and how to detect it.
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