Markdown image exfiltration: how chat output can leak data
A model told to add an image can send chat contents to an attacker's server when the page renders it. How the leak works and how to close it.
Deep dives, practical guides, and incident analyses from engineers who build Safeguard. No fluff, no vendor FUD — just what you need to ship secure software.
A model told to add an image can send chat contents to an attacker's server when the page renders it. How the leak works and how to close it.
How to map a retrieval-augmented generation app to the ATLAS techniques that apply: recon, poisoning, false entries, credential harvesting and data theft.
Five common beliefs about LLM security review, such as a better prompt fixing everything, and what OWASP, the NCSC and Anthropic guidance say instead.
A pull request from a stranger can contain text aimed at your AI reviewer. How indirect prompt injection reaches review bots and how to limit the damage.
A design rule for LLM security automation: when the model reads content from a party, give it no more power than that party has. Examples and trade-offs.
Credible but false output can cause breaches, legal exposure and bad code. What OWASP says about LLM misinformation and the controls that reduce it.
If you expose your own model through an API, limit logprobs, input size, rate and access. The OWASP controls against extraction, replication and abuse.
What access a coding agent actually needs, what to withhold, and how to scope files, shell, network and credentials so one bad instruction stays small.
What permissions an AI review bot or coding agent needs in CI, what to withhold, and how to check the token it runs with. A practical checklist.
Weekly insights on software supply chain security, delivered to your inbox.
Your first fix PR is minutes away.
No sales call required, even your agent can complete the purchase over MCP.